


Managing

school

facilities

Guide 4

Improving Security in schools



Department for
Education and Employment

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The guide takes account of comments from the Working Group on School Security, established by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment in January 1996. The Group included representatives of all the teacher associations, schools, governors, parents, the police, local education authorities, UNISON, OFSTED, the Home Office and the Health and Safety Executive.

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Improving security in schools

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Introduction

In all schools staff and pupils need to be able to work and learn in a safe and secure environment. Tragic incidents like the fatal stabbing of London headteacher Philip Lawrence in December 1995, the horrific killings at Dunblane Primary School in March 1996 and the machete attack at St Luke's Infants School in July 1996, though rare, highlight the need for schools to keep their security under review. This publication offers guidance on how to improve security in schools.

The guidance includes advice on the management of security and, in particular, on the roles of local education authorities, school governors and headteachers. It describes how to assess the risks which individual schools face and what measures should be considered to counter those risks. These measures are grouped according to whether a school is ranked low, medium or high risk, as indicated by the security survey and risk assessment method described in Section 5. This method provides a highly practical and relatively simple way of reviewing school security.

The guidance focuses on the security of school premises rather than on issues directly concerned with personal safety. The security of school premises is, however, clearly an important part of ensuring the personal safety of staff, pupils and visitors. It is therefore highly relevant to a school's overall health and safety policy. Detailed guidance on general health and safety matters, including statutory responsibilities and ways of dealing with potentially violent incidents, is available in a variety of publications from the Health and Safety Executive (see bibliography on page 45). Organisations such as the Suzy Lamplugh Trust also publish useful advice.

We hope that the guidance contained in this publication will be of help to headteachers, governors, caretakers, local education authority staff and all those concerned with making schools safer places.

1 The problem and its costs

Unfortunately no school can afford to ignore the threat of crime. Assaults on pupils and teachers in schools are increasing in number. Usually the assailant is a pupil of the school or a parent, but there are also incidents of intruders entering schools and attacking staff or children. While such incidents are still uncommon, the consequences to those involved can be devastating.

Arson is probably the next most serious crime that schools face. The cost of crime in England's schools, excluding unreported costs such as minor damage and uninsured losses, amounted to £49m in 1992-93, of which some £22m was

attributed to malicious fires. The remaining £27m was due to vandalism and theft and these crimes accounted for the great majority of individual incidents.

Modern schools contain many expensive items, including computers, musical instruments, TVs, video recorders and cameras. These need protecting against theft. Paying for crime means using money intended for other purposes such as maintenance, new equipment or more staff. Every school has some losses and the true costs are often underestimated. They include:

- .repairs to broken windows, doors and furniture;
- .replacing stolen or damaged equipment;
- .repairing/resetting intruder alarms;
- .staff overtime.

Such costs mount up. For example, preventing ten broken windows could save enough money for a new computer and stopping a spate of burglaries might begin to equate to the salary of a member of staff.

Non-financial costs are difficult to quantify, but can be the most important. They concern a breakdown in the continuity of education which, if unchecked, may result in a downward spiral of decay. They include:

- .damage to the reputation of a school, leading to falling enrolment;
- .a lowering of morale among staff and pupils;
- .disruption to learning caused by the loss of vital equipment;
- .a loss of examination course work.

Waiting until the problem has become chronic before taking action is neither effective nor sensible. This booklet aims to show practical ways in which security in schools can be improved, so as to better protect pupils, staff and the premises they occupy.

2 Managing the risks

Roles and responsibilities

Management responsibility for school security is usually shared between the local education authority (in the case of LEA-maintained schools), the governing body and the headteacher.

Role of the LEA

The main role of the LEA should be to maintain an overall policy for security within its schools, possibly as part of its health and safety policy, and to support and monitor its implementation by schools. In addition to providing resources, this might involve such things as arranging training, providing advice, inspection visits, and requiring and monitoring annual reports on health and safety from governing bodies.

Role of the governing body

The governing body is likely to need to draw up its own more detailed policy. Some LEAs insist on this as part of their arrangements for the local management of schools (LMS). The governing body's policy may need to include such things as:

- .how governors exercise their responsibilities -for example, whether there is a sub-committee of governors, or an individual governor, with specific responsibilities for security. This could be as part of a wider health and safety and/or

premises brief; .

arrangements for consulting and informing all staff about security;

.resources;

.training;

.arrangements for monitoring and reviewing the policy, including the frequency and nature of reports from the headteacher;

.the nature of governors' statutory annual reports to parents on security.

Role of the head teacher

The head will be responsible for implementing the security policy agreed by the governing body and for ensuring such things as that:

.all staff appreciate the importance of security and understand the school's policy and their own responsibilities;

.staff training needs are kept under review and training arranged as necessary;

.parents are informed of the security policy and encouraged to help;

.regular reports are made to the governing body and, where appropriate, the LEA;

.advice is obtained from the police, mechanisms are in place for continuing liaison with the police (eg, on local crime patterns) and there is an agreed method of contacting the police in the event of an emergency (and that all staff know of this);

.all crimes are reported to the police;

.there are periodic surveys/risk assessments of security;

.there are more regular routine security checks.

It will be for the headteacher, in consultation with staff and governors, to determine which tasks and functions to delegate to whom. There is no blueprint for this. Much will depend on factors such as the size of the school, the number of sites it occupies, the assessed level of risk it faces and general organisational issues.

Involving staff, pupils and parents

Whatever the arrangements for delegating certain functions, there needs to be a clear message that good security involves everyone in the school.

The commitment of staff tends to correlate with the amount of information they have and the degree of consultation there is in decision making. Training is also vital. Both teaching and non-teaching staff need to know the best methods to:

.protect pupils from hazards;

.guard against assault;

.safeguard property;

.contact the police;

.implement the school's emergency plan.

Advice on training should be available from the local police and, where appropriate, the LEA. Some further education colleges run courses on security aimed specifically at teachers and support staff.

New staff need to be informed of the school's security policy when they join. Regular open reviews will help keep everyone aware of the risks that are current and of how to respond.

Pupils should be encouraged to play their part. Parents should be informed that a policy is in place to safeguard the welfare of pupils and staff. They need to know what is required of them to make that policy work and how they can help beyond that minimum. A school's security policy may also be usefully made available to other interested parties, particularly the police and local community groups, to improve awareness and co-operation.

Security strategies

Each school is different and must develop a strategy tailored to its own unique circumstances. The measures used should reflect the character of a school and its educational needs as well as the demands of good security. What is appropriate for an inner city secondary school may well not suit a small, rural infant school. Each will have its own problems. Urban schools might appear to be the most at risk, yet rural schools are often the most vulnerable to theft and arson, particularly in 'holiday' areas.

A security strategy sets out how to implement the school's security policy. Whoever writes it will need to be informed by a security survey of the school. This will identify and assess risks. From that information recommendations can be made about which measures to use to minimise and control those risks.

Most, if not all, LEAs employ risk managers who will be able to advise the schools for which they are responsible. Expert advice can be obtained from the crime prevention departments of the police. This booklet includes general principles to point the way.

Identifying and assessing risks

The starting point for the successful management of security is to gather as much information as possible about the risks facing a school. The scale of the risk and the effectiveness of security measures can then be assessed.

A balanced overview of all risks can be obtained by carrying out a security survey and risk assessment. Section 5 of this booklet contains a method which schools can carry out themselves. This enables schools to assess themselves as low, medium or high risk depending on the score obtained, as shown in the following table. There is no such category as a 'no risk' school. A school that scores medium to high risk may well wish to consult a professional risk manager to check its rating.

The changing risks

A security survey is only valid at the time it is carried out. Risk is dynamic. Even introducing security measures can alter the pattern of risk. Changes also occur when there is a change of use. Examples include the conversion of a classroom to a specialist computer room or a parents' evening requiring a higher than usual level of vehicle security. Risks increase at certain times, for example after open days or evenings when strangers are given access to the school, or in the school holidays.

Overall score	Rating of school
< 50	Low risk - further no cost or low cost measures should be considered. Attention should be paid to maintenance and improvement of existing security measures.
50 - 100	Medium risk - medium to high cost measures should be considered. Seek advice from LEA, police and other agencies.
101 - 150	High risk - high cost measures should be considered. Seek advice from LEA, police and other agencies.

Not every change will be controllable. When one school introduces new security measures the incidence of crime at a neighbouring school may rise. This is known as crime displacement and is a common feature of many crime prevention initiatives.

The purpose of monitoring and reviewing security measures is either to anticipate changes in risk or, failing that, to respond to any change as quickly as possible.

It is important to be vigilant as larger crimes are often signposted by an increase in the number of minor incidents. A burglary might be preceded by a rise in trespass or an arson attack preceded by an outbreak of fires in rubbish bins, door alcoves or building recesses. A stranger reported wandering around one school might mean that all schools in the area are at risk of something more serious occurring (See **Parent and community involvement** on page 26).

Hindsight means that serious incidents always encourage better security measures, but successful security comes from the intelligent use of foresight to anticipate risk. For example, security measures should be in place before the arrival of valuable equipment.

High value, easily portable items such as sports equipment and computers are a popular target. A room by room survey will show where this type of equipment is kept overnight (the most vulnerable period) and each room can be given a security risk rating and classified as being at high, medium or low risk. Appropriate security measures can then be better targeted.


Local Computers

Consider alarming rooms,
Property marking or secure fixing

Store for video camera and TV

Consider relocation to resource area to
concentrate risk and security measures **Local**

Computers



A review is a formal overview carried out at set intervals, termly or annually, and is normally the subject of a written report. Monitoring tends to pick up changes in scale and frequency of risks, while reviews detect changes in types of risk.

What is often overlooked is that the effectiveness of security measures is also subject to change. Controlling risk demands extra effort from staff and pupils. No security measure will be implemented perfectly all of the time. Enthusiasm is at its greatest immediately after an incident, but very quickly security measures can become troublesome and may be either circumvented or forgotten.

It is unrealistic to expect staff to make security their first priority all of the time. The headteacher should arrange to monitor the level of risk in order to adjust the response, so that it is more in step with the level of threat. In larger schools this may require formal arrangements to inform staff and can apply either to the school as a whole or to individual risks.

Reporting incidents

All incidents of crime and all losses should be recorded and reported to the police and (where appropriate) the LEA. This requires:

- .accurate information. A simple, straightforward incident reporting system is essential if the information is to be comprehensive and accurate;
- .a standard method of classifying each incident. If one incident involves more than one type of crime then it should be classified under the crime involving the greatest loss;
- .a consistent system of assessing consequences. Financial costs are the easiest to quantify, but it is important to decide which cost elements will be included. Seeking simplicity by omitting as many costs as possible may create a distorted view: counting the cost of a burglary solely in terms of stolen equipment can conceal the cost of making good property damage. The ideal is to build up as full and accurate a picture as possible, but without unnecessary bureaucracy .

A suitable standard incident report form may be obtainable from the local police. Study of incident reports will reveal if:

- .some types of incident are more prevalent;
- .the pattern of crime is changing;
- .certain times of day or week, term or year are at a higher level of risk than others;
- .some locations are more popular, either as a point of entry to the school or as a final target. Trespass is most common where the grounds provide a convenient shortcut. Vandalism is usually found in areas like recesses and doorways which offer concealment or which are not under regular surveillance. Such areas may also be targets for arson attacks;

.some items of equipment are more likely to be stolen than others.

The new Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR) which came into force on 1 April 1996, require injuries caused by physical violence against a person at work, such as a teacher or self-employed person working on the premises, to be reported to the Health and Safety Executive*.

Insurance

Most schools have insurance which covers a package of risks. This includes vandalism, damage and arson. There is usually an excess whereby the school or local authority must pay the first part of any property damage. Where schools cannot afford to do this the insurance premium will be higher.

Personal accident/assault on staff and pupils is usually included in the policy. In addition, policies can include this cover for non-staff volunteers such as parents. This would be needed where parent volunteers take part in security patrols.

Insurance company assessors consider both the security risks and the security measures in place when assessing the level of premiums. They often advise on appropriate security measures and risk management procedures whose adoption may be reflected in lower insurance premiums. In cases of high risk they may request specific action before the company will provide insurance cover. Some insurance policies, for example, only cover electrical equipment in rooms that are alarmed.

.See HSE bibliography on page 45

3 Security measures

There is often a considerable gap between the expectations and the reality of security systems. An intruder alarm detects intruders. A CCTV (closed circuit television) camera takes pictures for possible identification later. Neither will prevent an intruder gaining access to a school and it is unlikely that they will stop them from leaving.

It is important to remember that no security measure stands alone. For example, the effectiveness of an intruder alarm depends as much upon denying intruders access to their target, and the response to an alarm, as it does on the reliability of the detection system. All security measures should be considered in relation to every other measure used by a school.

The measures adopted should be in proportion to the risk. Cost calculations used to decide between options should include running costs as well as initial capital costs. Running costs should include maintenance, staff costs, administration, training and depreciation of equipment.

Security and personal safety

An effective access control system (see **Visitors' access control** on page 18) will reduce the possibility of staff and pupils being attacked by an intruder, but it is still a possibility. However, most assaults are carried out by individuals who have passed through the access control system and they tend to be:

.pupil on pupil;

.pupil on staff;


.parent or relative of pupil on staff.

Contingency plans should be thought through for these eventualities. Staff can be trained to recognise and positively respond to potentially violent situations, but should not have to face aggressive situations alone. At least one other person should be present. In high risk schools an option is to provide staff with panic buttons or personal attack alarms

(See **Personal attack alarms** on page 36).

Security by design

Security is a major factor in the design of new school buildings. However, many existing schools were not designed with security in mind. The security of these schools can be improved, but it should be recognised that some sites and buildings are inherently difficult to make secure.



Features which commonly cause problems are.:

- .Open sites with long perimeters and poor fencing;
- .Multiple entrances open during the day;
- .Reception areas located far from school entrances;
- .Spread out schools with many independent buildings;
- .Isolated buildings;
- .Split sites;
- .Rights of way (roads and footpaths) through the school;
- .Easy access to roofs (eg, via stepped flat roofs, low eaves, low angle roofs) and insecure rooflights;

- .Over-complicated building perimeters with many recesses;
- .Recessed doorways;
- .Temporary buildings;
- .Public access out of school hours to community facilities (eg, swimming pools and sports halls)

Security and fire safety

Most security measures are intended to prevent unauthorised access to the school buildings and grounds. Some, particularly physical measures, can do so in a way that directly conflicts with fire safety although practical solutions can usually be found to these problems. The advice of the fire officer should be sought before security doors are fitted on fire escape routes or any decision made on the widespread use of polycarbonate glazing or sealed windows.

4 Selecting security measures

Appropriate security measures vary with the type and size of the school and its local circumstances. The starting point is the degree of risk faced by the school. This can be assessed using the guide in Section 5. The table overleaf lists the type of security measures which might be appropriate for low, medium and high risk schools.

This cannot, however be regarded as a blueprint for guaranteeing security in schools, particularly in the light of the killings at Dunblane primary school. Such an incident is clearly very rare and quite impossible to predict. As the Report of the Working Group on School Security* stated, there are limits to what might be done in terms of security to prevent something as extreme as occurred in Dunblane and at St. Luke's Infants School in Wolverhampton. It is ultimately a

.See bibliography on page 45

Type of school (Level of risk)	Possible security measures
Low risk schools (Risk assessment score < 50)	Visitors' access control A limited number of entrances Clearly defined boundaries and signs Secure doors and windows Out of hours access procedures A basic fire alarm system Additional fire compartmentation Cash handling procedures Buildings clear of materials that can be used for arson or vandalism Control of contractors' works Pupil involvement Parent and community involvement Property marking Security of computers Intruder alarms in sensitive areas (eg, headteacher's office, IT room)
Medium risk schools (Risk assessment score 50 - 100)	Comprehensive intruder alarm system Automatic fire detection Security lighting Precautions against damage to glazing Secure storage areas and IT rooms Securing the building envelope Security fencing Car parking and vehicle security
High risk schools (Risk assessment score 101 - 150)	Personal attack alarms CCTV Shutters or grilles on windows and doors Security guards or patrols Sprinkler system to limit fire damage

matter for each individual school to judge what constitutes reasonable security in the light of its own circumstances. By its very nature, an approach based on risk assessment cannot address the rare, extreme incident.

All schools, even those with a low risk, should have some security measures in place. However, it would be wrong to see security as nothing more than choosing the right control measures. Security is an attitude of mind. Security measures are tools and should be treated as such. Regardless of what claims may be made about the performance of security systems, and despite impressive technical specifications, their effectiveness depends upon their proper management and the personal commitment and training of staff, pupils and the community at large. To ensure the support of staff, it is helpful if they are involved in the planning of security measures. All school staff, teaching and non-teaching, should be familiar with security

procedures.

Security measures can be electronic, physical or human. Electronic measures such as intruder alarms, CCTV and access control systems are generally expensive to buy and install. Some systems such as CCTV have high running costs and involve sophisticated equipment that must be installed and commissioned by experts. Staff training, systems management and regular maintenance are essential for their full potential to be realised. It is advisable to employ an independent consultant to draw up system specifications, analyse tenders and appoint suitably qualified contractors. The Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers keeps a list of registered consultants many of whom specialise in security systems*.

These systems tend to become obsolete quickly, commonly having a useful working life of less than ten years. They can be introduced quickly and, in the short term, may be very successful, but long term success depends on staff commitment.

Physical measures vary in cost from moderate to expensive. They include: perimeter fencing, secure storage, heavy duty doors and locks, security lighting, window grilles and bars, and building

*See address on page 47

adaptations. They are generally used to harden target areas, relying on strength of materials and form of construction, and are best manufactured and installed by experts. They can easily have a forbidding appearance. They require little training for successful use, have low maintenance requirements and a long working life.

Human measures include: guarding and security patrols, educational programmes, community involvement, management, and 'School- watch' type schemes. While material costs are low, staff costs can be high. These measures attempt to either directly control behaviour or to change attitudes so that individuals choose to modify their own behaviour. They require high levels of staff training and long term commitment to be effective. Good inter-personal skills are essential. They are likely to be seen as the public face of the school and can only be introduced in association with a staff training programme. These measures may be slow to show results but can produce results that last.

No list of security measures can ever hope to be complete and not every measure will suit every school. The following pages contain descriptions of the more popular measures starting with those for lower risk schools, which all schools are advised to consider, and ending with those for higher risk schools.

Visitors' access control


An open door policy can put staff and pupils at risk. Problems may range from troublesome youths and angry parents to criminal trespass, abduction of children, and sometimes worse.. Access control offers some reassurance and protection, but its introduction can meet unexpected difficulties. The ability to log visitors (and sometimes staff and pupils) in and out of school is only one element of access control.

The problems

1. Schools want an open door policy to encourage community involvement.
2. There are too many separate teaching blocks.
3. There are too many entrances to buildings and grounds.
4. The school lacks a clearly defined, easily identifiable main entrance.
5. Frequent use of all entrances makes securing them extremely difficult.
6. Reception areas are sometimes unattended.
7. The public have the idea that they own the school and don't regard it as private property.

The solutions

1. Introduce a simple, workable access control system that meets the needs of your school.
2. Treat everyone who is not a member of staff or a pupil as an intruder until they have gone through the visitor reception procedure.
3. Provide visitors with a waiting area until they can be dealt with. This needs to be well signposted, preferably close to the main entrance, and welcoming. Attractive, but robust, furniture and the provision of reading material will help. It is important that staff working in such areas can easily contact other colleagues.
4. Identify legitimate visitors, monitor their arrival, movement around the school and departure time.
5. Make all visitors sign in and give the reason for their visit.
6. Give all visitors a badge or name tag which they wear as long as they are on the school premises. Pupils should not approach any stranger who is not wearing a badge and should be told to report all strangers and intruders immediately to the nearest member of staff.
7. There will be a considerable strain on the staff if every visitor is escorted. If only some visitors are to be escorted then the badge system should differentiate between escorted and unescorted visitors.




8. No visitor should be given unrestricted access to the school. It might be useful to indicate on the badge their final destination within the school.
9. Badges and tags should be only used once and should not be transferable either to another time or another individual.
10. Identification provided by local authorities, utilities or other organisations should not be accepted as an alternative to the school's own system.
11. School procedures should exist for parents to obtain permission to take children out of school during the school day and to inform the school when someone else will collect children at the end of the day.

Whatever system is adopted, it should be simple to operate. Intruders are not an everyday occurrence and if access control procedures are not a matter of daily routine, they are likely to fail when needed.

In some situations it may be desirable to strengthen the access control system. For example some schools lock their gates during a large part of the day. Also electronic access control systems have been successfully used to secure the front entrances of primary schools under the control of secretarial staff. Secondary schools are more difficult to secure in this way, due to their layout and the need for pupils to come and go more freely. An important balance has to be struck between an open school policy and the exclusion of intruders.

At the same time there is a need for deliveries to be supervised and checked and recorded on receipt. Unlocking a delivery point in anticipation of goods arriving can leave the area susceptible to theft or vandalism. Consideration needs also to be given to the discreet disposal of the packaging, since it indicates the arrival of new and possibly valuable goods.



Clear boundaries, entrances and footpaths

Clearly defined boundaries

It is important that the public knows the extent of the school grounds. This does not always mean that the grounds are fenced, but some form of boundary is necessary to mark the perimeter and to act as a visual indicator of trespass. At the same time, care needs to be taken that landscaping does not act as a screen for potential intruders. It is helpful to have one main entrance, preferably visible from the reception area. Separate entrances for pedestrians are commonplace, but to increase security they could be opened only at peak arrival and departure times.

Rights of way

Rights of way through school grounds may present a particular security risk. Schools which are concerned about this may be able to have the right of way re-routed. They can also object if a new right of way, or additional use of an existing right of way is proposed. They should contact their local authority (usually the Highways Department) for advice.

Secure doors and windows

All external door locks and window catches need to provide a similar level of security. Some fire exit doors with push bars may need to be upgraded but fire escape routes should not be locked off. Exit doors can be fitted with alarms to warn of unauthorised use during normal hours. It may be worth fitting locks to windows as well as doors. There should be strict control of keys with key storage boxes in alarmed areas. Regular checks ought to be in place to confirm the whereabouts of keys. Main school keys should never be given to pupils or parents.

Doors fitted with push button combination locks and self-closers can give additional security to offices and staffrooms used by large numbers of staff, where constant locking and unlocking by key would be a nuisance. As the combination can be compromised at any time, these locks should not be used to protect secure areas.

Out of hours access

Staff, pupils or contractors may require access to school buildings during holidays, weeks and out of normal school hours. This will pose a risk to building security if alarm systems are disabled or proper locking-up procedures are not followed. Access can be provided to certain areas of the building only, whilst keeping the remainder locked and alarmed. However, this requires careful planning of the security systems.

There may also be a risk to personal safety where staff are working alone, particularly in isolated buildings. The risk may be greater when it is dark and the lights in the room are on, identifying that a particular teacher is in a vulnerable position. Simple remedies, such as the provision of curtains or blinds, may help the individual concerned feel less vulnerable, but will not suffice on their own. Procedures should be worked out to minimise any risk. Telephones, pagers or personal attack alarms can provide additional security.

Fire detection systems

Arson is one of the most serious security problems faced by schools. The ways of reducing the risk are:

- .Fire safety management -eg, adequate maintenance of fire check doors and keeping them closed;
- .Building design for fire safety -eg, compartmentation and escape routes;
- .Fire detection and alarm systems;
- .Regular inspections to check for fire and security risks.

The Department's Building Bulletin 7* gives advice on fire precautions affecting school buildings. It advises all schools to have a fire alarm system. In all but low risk schools this would preferably have a degree of automatic detection. In very high risk schools the installation of a sprinkler system to limit the extent of fire damage may be worthwhile.

The Arson Prevention Bureau has produced a booklet giving advice on fire safety management*. The next booklet in the current 'Managing School Facilities' series from the Department will cover fire safety.

Cash handling

Cash is an attractive target. It should be a firm rule that cash is not kept on the school premises overnight. At the end of the school day, cash should be removed from all vending machines including photocopiers and by each machine there should be a notice to the effect that there is no money left in the machine overnight. Tills in cafeterias and offices should be emptied and left open overnight.

Once money has been collected for school meals, class photographs, school trips, etc, it should be held in

the school safe until it can be banked. It must never be kept in desk drawers or filing cabinets even if they are locked. There may be limits on insurance cover for cash held on the premises.

.See bibliography on page 45

When cash is counted on school premises, this should happen away from public view, preferably in a locked room and by two people. Staff should be advised that their personal safety takes priority in the event of an attempt being made to steal money from the school.

The safest way to bank money is to use a cash-handling service from a security company. Some local authorities will arrange this. If members of staff have to take money to the bank regularly themselves, the school may want to seek advice from the police. In any event, two members of staff should be involved and, as far as possible, they should vary the time and route.

Personal Property

Pupils should be discouraged from bringing valuable items to school. Confiscation is one way of doing this. However, there can be legal problems if items are subsequently lost and it is recommended that items are returned to parents at the earliest opportunity.

Provision of lockers for personal property discourages theft. The Department's Architects and Building Paper 15* gives advice on Lockers and Secure Storage.

A common problem is theft from unobserved bicycle sheds. This can be prevented by locating them in a position overlooked by classrooms or administration.

Bicycle shed overlooked by classrooms



School Property

Schools should keep an asset register to record the quantity and location of school property. An asset check at least once a year is recommended.

*See Bibliography on page 46

Staff are advised to keep a log of borrowed equipment to avoid confusion over whether or not items have been stolen. Certificates of authorisation should be given to the borrower.

Loose materials

Loose materials left outside buildings can be used for arson or vandalism. Large fires can be started from

waste left in rubbish bins and skips. Wooden pallets and wooden huts can also be deployed. Other materials, such as scaffolding poles can be used for vandalism or to break in. Skips should not be placed within 15 metres of a building. Rubbish bins should be secured to a post or locked in a secure compound.



Contractors

Contractors working at school can affect normal security precautions in a variety of ways. These include:

- .building material lying around that could be used as ammunition to smash windows or as fuel for an arson attack;
- .thieves attracted on to the site by the presence of contractors' equipment;
- .scaffolding giving access to previously secure upper floor areas;
- .opening the school for the contractor at weekends and holidays resulting in access to areas beyond those used by the contractor;
- .alarm systems being disrupted;
- .workmen not being screened in the same way as school or local authority staff.

Before contractors are allowed on site the effect of their activities should be reviewed. Any action necessary to maintain security at its normal level should be agreed with the contractor. A 'permit to work' system should be set up for any work involving the application of heat.

Contractors engaged on routine day to day maintenance must always check in with the school before starting work (see **Visitors' access control**, page 18).



Pupil involvement

Teaching honesty, respect for the individual and social responsibility is part of school life and in every curriculum. Allowing pupils to help manage a part of the budget earmarked for combating vandalism can encourage a sense of responsibility and produce a reduction in criminal damage as they endeavour to release funds for projects of their own choosing. This may be done through a school council or youth action group. Various agencies can help. For example, most police forces have a school liaison officer.

The success of this approach depends upon it being sustained over the full age range. This requires the wholehearted support of staff and the enthusiastic participation of pupils. Parents might also be involved. Intermittent, one-off projects, however attractive or successful they may appear, will have little effect over the longer term.

Parent and community involvement

If parents understand the need for security it makes a school's job much easier. Similarly, parents will be reassured if they know the school is committed to the safety of the pupils and staff as well as the school buildings. To increase awareness of security it can be beneficial

to publish the security policy in a school brochure for new parents. If a school is seen as a part of and not apart from the community it serves, it can expect the community's active support and protection. This will only occur if the community is vigorously encouraged to take part in school activities and to use the school and its facilities. In this way the school will be valued for what it has to offer.


'Schoolwatch' schemes encourage neighbours living round the school to report any suspicious persons or unusual events to the police. They will be most successful at those schools which are largely surrounded by, and in clear view of, neighbouring houses or which are clearly visible from the road.

Fear of reprisal can make neighbours reluctant to report incidents directly to the police. If this is likely, schools can consider giving carefully selected neighbours, who are prepared to make a commitment to help the school, the contact number of a member of staff who could then pass the details on to the police. It is possible that members of staff will not wish their personal telephone numbers to be circulated, in which case an organisation providing central station monitoring of intruder alarms might be willing to offer this service.

In addition to 'Schoolwatch' there are schemes whereby schools exchange information on current matters of concern regarding security. For example, if a stranger is spotted loitering outside a school the information is quickly passed on to other schools in the area. One way of doing this is by using a paging information service. The school spotting the stranger contacts the central station and the information is relayed to other schools via pagers carried by a member of staff in each school.


Property marking

All expensive, portable equipment should be marked as belonging to the school. This can be done by:



-

The method used should:



The postcode and a suffix of two or three letters indicating the school name can be used. Valuable and recognisable items should also be photographed.

Property marking does not prevent items being stolen and it is always possible for the markings to be defaced or removed but it does extend the time a thief is at risk. Allied with other security measures this can be a useful defence and an aid to recovering stolen property. Portable equipment can be secured using low cost adhesive pads, though these are susceptible to heated cheesewires. Alternatively anchor chains may be used or items may be kept in secure stores.

Computer security

Schools often have a number of computer systems. These may include both stand-alone and networked computers.

The data stored is an important asset that should be included in the school security strategy. It may include administration records and coursework which is vital to the running of the school. Backing-up procedures for the data should be well defined and conscientiously followed. The method used should be kept under review as advances in technology continue to make the process quicker and easier. Paper copies of some work will also need to be stored.

Storage of key data and programs, either off-site or in a fire proof safe, allows recovery of systems even after total system loss due to fire; theft or accident.

Intruder alarms

An intruder alarm system depends on effective detection and signalling, effective building management and adequate response to alarms.

Detection Systems. In schools these are normally based upon some form of protection which triggers an alarm as a result of changes in environmental conditions. These changes are not always caused by an intruder and may be false alarms. The most common type of detector is the passive infra-red (PIR). Dual technology detectors (ie, combined passive infra-red and microwave detectors) are used where false alarms are likely to be a problem.

False alarms with passive infra-red detectors can be caused by:

- .free hanging decorations such as mobiles;
- .warm air from fan-convactor heaters;
- .curtains moving in draughts;
- .spiders;
- .user error.

If false alarms are to be avoided then the choice and location of detectors should be compatible with the environment in which they are to operate. The number of units determines the size of the system. The larger the system then the greater the chance of false alarms and the more difficult it is to manage. The number of detectors should be kept to a minimum. It is not necessary to place a detector in every room. Even so, larger systems may need to be divided into zones to be easily manageable. Zoning should take account of evening and out of hours use so that areas not in use can remain protected by the alarm system.

Signalling Systems. When a detector is triggered then the system must raise the alarm. It can do this in two ways:


.by passing information on the alarm to a central station via the telephone network. This is a remote signalling system. Some systems have a limited capability to verify the nature of the alarm by monitoring visual or audio signals at the central station. If it is a false alarm the central station can remotely reset the system or if it is genuine pass the information on to the keyholder and the police. The security of telephone chambers and incoming mains is worth considering; overhead telephone lines are vulnerable to attack and underground lines may be worthwhile. It is also possible to use the cellular radio network which is independent of telephone lines;

.by sounding bells or sirens on site. If there is also a remote signalling system then the sounding of the bells might be delayed with the intention of catching the intruders. The Association of Chief Police Officers recommend a 10 minute delay.

The Department's Building Bulletin 69 gives comprehensive advice on choosing detectors and alarm systems for schools.

Effective building management. The most common cause of false alarms which leads to withdrawal of police response, is the lack of attention to correct opening and closure procedures -for example, staff leaving doors open when resetting the alarm after out of hours use.

Adequate response to alarms. Unless there is a prompt, effective response to an alarm then the intruders can escape. The police will respond as operational conditions permit but may decline to do so if there is a history of false alarms. It may not be wise to allow a school caretaker or other member of staff to be first on site by themselves when they may encounter determined and possibly violent intruders. It might be necessary to investigate using a security company to make the initial response.



Security lighting

External lighting is provided to:


- .illuminate pathways and car parking areas to enable individuals to see and move safely around the school grounds after dark;
- .deny intruders the cover of darkness by illuminating their access routes and target areas thus making them visible to passers-by and neighbours. This is security lighting.

To be successful both types of lighting must be reliable and provide adequate levels of illumination. In addition those areas lit by security lighting must be under regular surveillance from one or more of the following:

- .neighbouring property or passers-by;
- .CCTV, in which case infra-red (black or non-visible light) can be used;
- .security patrols.

Like CCTV, lighting units are vulnerable to attack and security lighting is particularly prone to deliberate damage. All lighting units and associated wiring should be located and installed in such a manner as to reduce the risk of deliberate damage.

If areas lit by security lighting are not protected by fences and under surveillance, there is every likelihood that they will become informal, floodlit play areas. The Department's Building Bulletin 78 gives more details on security lighting.



Glazing

Glazed openings are a means of access for thieves as well as a target for vandals. Repairing broken windows can be a major drain upon building maintenance budgets. Options to reduce the incidence of broken windows include:

- .keeping yards and grounds free from any material that could be used as ammunition;
- .reducing the amount of glazing. In many schools up to half, sometimes more, of existing glazing can be replaced by solid panels without noticeably reducing natural lighting levels. This will also result in significant energy savings;
- .use of laminated glass in vulnerable areas. This assumes the school's incident reports are sufficiently detailed to identify the areas most at risk;
- .use of polycarbonate glazing in vulnerable areas. This should be done with caution. Not all window frames can accept polycarbonate material and it should not be used on designated fire escape routes. In addition polycarbonate material is subject to UV degradation, vulnerable to scratching (even from window cleaning) and damage by heat. Polycarbonate glazing is not suitable for use as safety glass*;
- .use of adhesive safety film to maintain the integrity of the window if attacked;
- .use of shutters or grilles to protect the glazing.

Secure storage

Intruders are unconcerned about damage and are willing to destroy several items of equipment to steal. one. PCs and their memory chips, musical instruments, video equipment, fax machines, network hardware, etc, may all require to be located in secure areas or to be locked away outside school hours. A secure store, where valuable equipment can be kept, should resist attack by any means up to, but excluding, power tools and flame cutters for at least the response time of the intruder alarm system. This is normally taken as around fifteen minutes.

Secure storage can be a secure storeroom, cupboard, safe or devices securing individual items of equipment to worksurfaces. The spread of computers and similar equipment throughout school(s) means that it is often necessary to be able to make entire classrooms secure areas. A secure store puts all the valuables in one place and great care must be

* See Bibliography on page 46, **DfEE** Broadsheet 28

taken in designating areas as secure stores. A locked door does not make an area secure. Metal lockers,

desk drawers and filing cabinets are not secure. Existing classrooms and storerooms will require considerable adaptation before they can meet the fifteen minute rule. An alternative that has been used in IT rooms is to fill the room with a glycol smoke screen triggered by the intruder alarm.



Secure store for valuable equipment

Access to secure areas should be by security doors. Only secure areas should be locked at night or when the school is unoccupied. The normal classroom door and its frame is incapable of withstanding a moderate attack. Usually such doors should be left closed but unlocked overnight, as should filing cabinets and desk drawers. Allowing intruders a degree of movement around the school will make it more likely that they will be detected by the intruder alarm system. Fixing a sheet of metal to an existing door does not make it a security door and may create more problems than it solves. Much other work is needed to bring it up to security door status.

Keys to secure areas should only be issued to those who require access and a record should be kept of keyholders. If the keys are kept on the premises overnight then they should be locked in the school safe and the key to that taken off the premises. If a key to a secure area is lost then the lock must be replaced immediately.

Advice on the specification of doors, shutters and partitions, as well as alarm systems, may be obtained from local authority risk managers, local police crime prevention officers and insurers' security experts.

Secure storage areas

- .If possible select a room with no windows, external doors or rooflights, otherwise fit bars/grilles;
- .Install a security door or roller shutter designed to withstand attack; .
- Ensure walls offer the same resistance as doors and windows, eg, attack with sledgehammers. Prevent access through ceiling voids or from roofs; ,
- Use an intruder alarm system to protect approaches to the secure store and also its interior.

Daily storage of valuable equipment can be a chore for staff but decreases the opportunity for theft considerably. If daily storage is not

feasible, special end of term procedures are **strongly recommended**.

Securing the building envelope

The security of the building envelope can be increased by measures such as:

.fitting security roller shutters on doors and windows, preferably mounted internally and alarmed to give an early warning of attempted break-ins;

Steel gate enclosing a recessed doorway



External security shutters



Internal security shutters



.coating scaleable walls and drain pipes with anti-climb paint; .preventing access onto low roofs.

This is usually a cheaper option than increasing the security of the site perimeter.

Security fencing

The purpose of security fencing is to prevent intrusion. Casual intruders and dog walkers are usually deterred by a 1.8 -2m high fence. To deny access to determined intruders the fence must present a formidable obstacle at least 2.5m high and be able to withstand a high level of physical attack. In very high risk schools 3 -3.5m may be needed.



Building recess protected by palisade fencing

Fencing of this type is typically metal palisade or weld-mesh and usually requires planning permission. To be effective it must be continuous and all gates must offer the same protection as the main fenceline. The long perimeters of many schools make it a very expensive option. A cheaper alternative is its use to enclose an inner perimeter, or to close off recesses, together with an increase in the security of the building envelope, whilst maintaining means of escape in the event of fire. This can be just as effective as completely encircling the school boundary. Fencing needs to be inspected to check for breaching, eg, by digging underneath or other damage.

The planting of dense thorny hedgerows along the school perimeter can either be an alternative or supplement to security fencing. It has a less forbidding appearance and can be effective, but to maintain sightlines for surveillance breadth of hedgerow is better than height. It should not be used close to buildings or where it can provide cover for an intruder.

Car parking and vehicle security

It is only recently that schools have been designed with realistic levels 'of car parking facilities. Most have had to adapt existing space. Everyone parking in the school grounds should clearly understand that they are responsible for the security of their vehicle and its contents, but it is good practice to provide some vehicle security. Car parking is better located away from play areas, but under natural surveillance from the school. Lighting for evening and winter use may be necessary.

School minibuses are a target for theft. It is worthwhile specifying locking wheel nuts and having the windows etched with the school's name and postcode and/or the vehicle's registration number.

Personal attack alarms

One measure to enhance personal safety is to provide staff with panic buttons or personal attack alarms. Staff who believe they are under imminent threat of attack can press them to summon assistance. It is simple in principle, but in practice advice should be sought on the most suitable type of system.

A first consideration is who will respond to the alarm? Do staff in neighbouring classrooms respond? If so who cares for their class while they are giving assistance? Remember that whoever responds to an alarm may have to deal with an attack in progress. What action should be taken in such circumstances?

Secondly, is the alarm to be audible or silent? An audible alarm will reassure the victim that the alarm has worked and may scare off an attacker. It might also be the final trigger which turns a potentially violent situation into a reality.

There are two kinds of personal attack alarms:

.Aerosol or battery driven screech alarms intended to deter an attacker and, hopefully, bring assistance from bystanders.

.Panic buttons which may be in fixed locations or carried by members of staff. These raise the alarm at a central station, which may be in the school office or the central station monitoring the intruder alarm system.

If you are planning to install panic buttons then consider:

- .where the alarm will be raised. The monitoring station must be manned whenever staff may be at risk;
- .how the alarm will indicate the scene of the attack. Panic buttons carried by staff may show which member of staff is being attacked, but not their location;
- .who will respond to an alarm;
- .how long will it take to respond; if staff on site are expected to respond then the response time is likely to be under five minutes. Even this may be too long. An attack can be over in seconds. Raising the alarm at a central station may mean a delay of five, ten or even fifteen minutes before those responding arrive on site. Is this acceptable? If not then how can the response be speeded up? It may be worth considering using staff on site to see to the safety of pupils and other members of staff, while containing the situation until the police or security personnel can deal with the attacker. It may also be worth providing caretakers with means of summoning assistance eg, mobile telephones or two-way radios;
- .whether the panic buttons would be open to abuse by pupils.

The British Standards Institute (BSI) are planning to introduce a Kitemark certification for personal attack alarms and will be publishing a specification in late Autumn 1996.

Closed circuit television(CCTV)

CCTV can be used to provide surveillance of areas not directly watched by staff; remote areas; areas prone to vandalism or theft; or for general premises protection out of school hours.

It is important to specify the operational requirements for CCTV systems to avoid the purchase of inappropriate and ineffective systems. This also enables the performance of completed systems to be tested. The operational requirement of each camera location will determine the necessary size of the screen image. This in turn affects the type of lenses and cameras used and the area that can be covered by each camera.



CCTV camera with security light

Operational requirements can range from simple deterrence, through monitoring of disturbances and groups of individuals, to recognition of known individuals and identification for legal purposes. Local police Crime Prevention Officers are able to advise on suitable operational requirements.


CCTV pictures are transmitted, normally by cable, to a convenient location where they can be viewed on a monitor and recorded. How the pictures are to be monitored is an important consideration.

It is possible to monitor off-site during out of hours periods so that a central monitoring station can notify the police in the event of a crime, but this is more expensive than monitoring on site. An on-site recorder is best located in a secure container in the main reception area or premises manager's office, where the monitor can be observed during school hours.

Events triggered, eg, by passive infra-red detector, can be recorded on the video tape, enabling quick checking of the recordings by staff during school hours.

Colour cameras are now available with good resolution even at low light levels. Security lighting should be considered together with the design of the CCTV system. Floodlights operated by passive infra-red detectors can be installed with the cameras.

Cameras and their cables are vulnerable to attack and their protection should be considered. The Department's Building Bulletin 75 gives further details.



Security patrols

Patrols and guards can be used to complement other security measures in high risk schools. They provide a considerable deterrent, but have high running costs for the labour employed. There are a large number of firms providing this service, though they vary in quality. They should preferably belong to the British Security Industry Association (BSIA)* but, if not, the police should be asked to check their credentials. Security patrols are useful after a major incident, such as a large fire, when normal security measures may be inoperative.

There have been instances when local authorities have temporarily diverted security staff from normal duties on housing estates to tackle specific problems in schools. The results have been encouraging.

As an alternative to commercial patrols some schools use staff and parent volunteers, but this involves large commitments of time and can therefore be difficult to organise. In these circumstances the police may provide a Special Constable to accompany the patrols. If the patrols are to be high profile then 'high visibility' jackets will be useful. The school will need to check that their insurance covers parent volunteers for this duty (see **Insurance** on page 12).

Agreed procedures must be established for effective communications and handling of incidents. In addition to Health and Safety guidance on procedures, security patrols must be advised of the relevant laws, such as section 40 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 and section 5 of the 1986 Public Order Act, both of which can be invoked to deal with trouble-makers in and around schools.

* Address on page 47

5 Security survey and risk assessment

A Security survey gives a rounded picture of the risks that your school faces and the security measures in existence. Without this information it is difficult to assess:

- .the type and scale of risk;
- .any trends or patterns in the incidents occurring at the school; .the selection of security measures;
- .the efficiency of the chosen security measures.

Checklist

To help you conduct a survey and risk assessment the following checklist is provided. It is divided into three parts:

Part 1 Incidence of crime

This section of the survey assesses the type, scale, patterns and trends of incidents which have actually happened in the last 12 months.

This part of the risk assessment can be based on an analysis of reported incidents. However, if your school does not yet have an incident reporting procedure a more subjective assessment will have to be made, possibly based on a discussion with the local police.

Part 2 Environment and buildings

This section of the survey assesses the environmental and building factors which contribute to school security.

Part 3 Security measures

This section of the survey assesses the degree and effectiveness of the security measures employed.

Parts 2 and 3 are based on a security survey conducted by walking around the school. Each element of the checklist is graded using a scale from 0 to 5 points, scoring 0 for low security risk and 5 for high risk. Under each heading examples of the two extremes are given. A total score of less than 50 indicates that the school is low risk; 50-100 indicates medium risk; and 101-150 indicates high risk.

Low risk			High risk		
0	1	2	3	4	5

Part 1: Incidence of Crime in last 12 months

1. Trespass

No cases of trespassers in school grounds

Trespasser commonly present in school grounds -

2. Vandalism

No cases of vandalism reported

Frequent and costly vandalism of school buildings -

3. Theft/burglary

No cases of theft or burglary

Frequent theft or burglary -

4. Fire

No arson attacks in the locality

Schools in locality have suffered from arson attacks -

5. Safety -attacks on staff or pupils

No attacks or threats reported

Attacks inside school or in vicinity of school -

6. Drug/solvent abuse

No problems reported

School or locality problem with drugs or solvent abuse -

Part 2: Environment and buildings

1. Incidence of crime in surrounding area.

Locality has a low crime rate Locality has high crime rate as reported to police

2. School overlooked from roads and/or housing

Grounds clearly visible to public Unobserved grounds

3. Boundaries, fences and gates

Boundaries well defined with fences and gates to grounds preventing all but determined intruders

No fences or gates preventing unauthorised access.

4. Clearly defined entrances

Clear entrances with signs directing visitors No clear entrances or multiple entrances

5. Well organised reception area and visitors' control

Pass system in operation with badges issued to all visitors No system of recording visitors

6. Car parking

Car parks well lit and overlooked No safe place to park, car parks unlit and not overlooked or surrounded by trees

Condition and appearance of buildings

Buildings well kept and in good repair with no graffiti and not vandalised Buildings badly kept and in state of disrepair, graffiti covered and vandalised

8. Detached and temporary buildings

No buildings detached from main block Many detached buildings including temporary huts

9. Recesses and internal courtyards

No places for intruders to hide and break in unobserved Numerous places for intruders to hide and break unobserved

10. Secure exit doors

Doors secure against all but most determined intruders ____ Fire exit doors easily forced, inadequate locks

11. Secure windows and roof lights

Windows and roof lights protected against burglars Windows and roof lights provide easy access

12. Valuable equipment that is easily stolen and disposed of

Few computers, TVs and video cassette recorders Many computers, keyboards, Fax's, camcorders, etc.

13. Fire precautions

Buildings have adequate fire compartmentation,

fire/smoke barriers and fire doors !!!!! Over-large fire compartments and lack of fire/smoke barriers and doors

14. Community ethos and support for school

Strong community and parent support benefits security eg, active PTA Insignificant parent or community involvement or negative attitudes

15. Out of hours use of school facilities

No reported problems and/or security benefit due to out of hours use Many security problems due to out of hours use, special risks eg, bars, social clubs

Part 3: Security measures

1. Schoolwatch scheme

Efficient system of reporting suspicious incidents eg, paging via satellite link !!!! No scheme in operation

2. Pupil involvement

Successful youth action group or school council _No involvement in security

3. Waste Bins

Waste and recycling bins locked up every night Unlocked mobile bins left around school

4. Security lighting

Lighting of all entrances, footpaths and building facades _No lighting

5. Surveillance

Efficient surveillance eg, CCTV covering
perimeter or security patrols No system

6. Intruder alarms

System using passive Infra-red detectors In all , ground floor perimeter and other vulnerable rooms No system

7. Fire detection/
sprinkler systems

Automatic system linked to fire brigade _No automatic detection

8. Property marking

All valuable property marked and kept in
secure store or secured locally No markings on property

9. Cash handling
procedures

Secure methods in operation It 11 I II Procedures lacking

Security risk assessment score summary

Part 1 -Crime (0-30)

Part 2 -Environment & Buildings (0-75)

Part 3 -Security measures (0-45)

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Grand Total (0-150 points)

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above most police forces and fire services as well as many local authorities. Publications on security related matters aimed directly at schools.

Organisations

Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers, Delta House, 222 Balham High Road, London, SW12 9BS, Tel: 0181 675 5211, Fax: 0181 675 5449.

ALARM Association of Local Authority Risk Managers, Galaxy Building, Southwood Crescent, Farnborough, Hampshire, GU14 0NJ. Tel: 01252 387912.

Arson Prevention Bureau, 140 Aldersgate Street, London, EC1A 4DD. Tel: 0171 600 1695. Fax: 0171 600 1487.

FPA Fire Protection Association, Melrose Avenue, Borehamwood, Herts, WD6 2BJ. Tel: 0181 207 2345, Fax: 0181 236 9701.

LPCB Loss prevention Certification Board Ltd, address as FPA, Tel: 0181 236 9600, Fax: 0181 236 9601.

NACOSS National Approval Council for Security Systems, Queensgate House, 14 Cookham Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire, SL6 8AJ. Tel: 01628 37512 Fax: 0162 8773367.

SSAIB Security Systems and Alarm Inspection Board, 70/71 Camden Street, North Shields, Tyne and Wear, NE30 1NH.

ECA Security Group, The Electrical Contractors' Association, ESCA House, 34 Palace Court, Bayswater, London, W2 4HY, Tel: 0171 229 1266.

BSIA British Security Industry Association, Security House, Barbourne Road, Worcester, WR1 1RT. Tel: 01905 21464 Fax: 01905 613625.

Youth Action Groups Initiative, Signal Point, Station Road, Swindon, Wiltshire, SN1 1FE, Tel: 01793 514596, Fax: 01793 514654.

The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, The National Charity for Personal Safety, 14 East Sheen Avenue, London, SW14 8AS, Tel: 0181 392 1839, Fax: 0181 392 1830.

Department for Education and Employment Architects and Building Branch, Caxton House, 6-12 Tothill Street, Westminster, London, SW1H 9NF.

Tel: 0171 273 6237, Fax: 0171 273 6762.

School Security Team, Sanctuary Buildings, Great Smith Street, London, SW1P 3BT, Tel 0171 925 5000, Fax: 0171 925 6986.

